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Abstract 
 
Institutionalist theories of politics emphasise the role institutions play in inducing 
stability. The Institutionalist lexicon is replete with terms such as ‘path dependence’ and 
‘lock-in,’ intended to convey resistance to change. Insofar as institutionalists do address 
change, they do so in terms of sporadic moments of dramatic change brought about by 
factors exogenous to their theoretical framework. The paper challenges such claims, on 
the basis of a study of the development of the European Union’s security policies. It 
proposes an Institutionalist approach to explaining institutional change arguing that 
under certain conditions, institutional change can be both continuous and highly 
significant. Consequently, the metaphor of ‘Chinese whispers’ better captures the nature 
of repeated, incremental and often off path institutional development than that of path 
dependence. 
 
 
 
 
 
   3 
 
Introduction 
 
Those interested in the study of international security institutions confront something of 
a dilemma. On the one hand, realist claims regarding the epiphenomenal nature of 
institutions and lack of independent causal effect. Even those theoretical approaches that 
take institutions seriously seem of only limited utility.  Institutionalism has focussed on 
continuity. Argument being that institutional structures  induce stability. A whole 
Institutionalist lexicon of terms ranging form path dependence, to increasing returns, to 
lock in, testifies to the emphasis placed on stability at the expense of change.  
 
However, the last two decades have been a period of almost continuous instability for 
European security institutions. Rapid change has perhaps been most visible in the 
remarkable transformation of the European Union. A civilian power when the Berlin 
Wall fell, the EU has developed into an international organisation unique amongst such 
organisations in its possession of virtually all the instruments of security policy, including 
a nascent defence capability.  
 
The purpose of what follows is to attempt to provide an alternative conceptualisation of 
the nature and implications of institutions and institutional change, based on a detailed 
empirical examination of the development of what has come to be called the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
1 The paper argues that Institutionalist approaches 
to institutional change are based on several questionable assumptions. When these are 
relaxed, a different picture emerges, in that relatively common small-scale institutional 
change can cumulatively produce profound, off-path and highly unpredictable change. 
.  
 
The paper is divided into four parts. The first illustrates the way in which Institutionalist 
accounts are biased in favour of institutional stability. A second provides the outlines of 
an Institutionalist explanation of institutional change which challenges prevailing notions 
of path dependence.  Section three briefly surveys the development of ESDP, whilst 
section four illustrates how the contestation of institutions, friction between them, and 
                                                 
1 For useful surveys of this, see Howorth 2007, Jones 2007, Menon, 2009,    4 
institutional  adaptability  conspire  generate  a  continual  process  of  unpredictable  and 
significant institutional change.  
 
Institutionalism and Institutional Change 
 
Institutionalism is perhaps the dominant approach in the contemporary study of politics.
2 
Developed out of a perceived need for an intellectual alternative to the individualistic, 
instrumental approaches to social science that predominated after WW2, it is rooted in 
an acceptance of ‘higher order’ influences upon individual action,
3 privileging structure 
over  agency.  Perhaps  unsurprisingly  given  its  genesis  in  opposition  to  approaches 
emphasising individual freedom of choice and action the key insight provided by much 
Institutionalist scholarship is that such higher order influences tend to promote stability.
4 
As  one  prominent  proponent  puts  it,  established  ‘institutions  generate  powerful 
inducements that reinforce their own stability and further development’.
5  
 
A  common  theme  within  this  ‘iconography  of  order’  (Orren  and  Skowronek  1994 
page?) is the notion of increasing returns, (sometimes referred to as self-reinforcing or 
positive  feedback  processes).
6  Douglass  North  has  argued  that  insights  generated  by 
studies  of  increasing  returns  in  the  development  of  technology  can  be  equally  well 
applied  to  institutions,
7  and  indeed  several  scholars  deploy  such  analogies  in  their 
discussions of institutions: John Ikenberry draws on the case of the triumph of VHS 
videocassettes  and  Microsoft  software  to  reinforce  his  arguments  about  increasing 
returns processes western security institutions,
8 while Paul Pierson discusses the ‘polya 
urn’ process to illustrate the self-reinforcing nature of certain historical processes.
9  
 
The  core  insight  of  such  studies  is  that  increasing  returns  create  path  dependence,  or 
situations in which preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movement in 
the same direction, with each move down the path increasing the probability of further 
                                                 
2 For useful surveys, see Hall and Taylor, 1996, , Peters 1999, Thelen, 1999, . 
3 Clemens and Cook, 1999, , 
4 Lieberman, 2002,  
5 Pierson, 2000, 255 
6 Krasner, 1988, , Pierson, . 
7 North 1990, 95. 
8 Ikenberry, 1998-9, 72, 74 
9 Pierson, 253   5 
similar steps.
10 John Ikenberry applies such insights to international security institutions, 
emphasising institutional ‘stickiness,’ whereby ‘the core institutions of western order have 
sunk their roots ever more deeply into the political and economic structures of the states 
that participate within the order’.
11 Not only do participants develop a vested interest in 
maintaining  existing  institutional  arrangements,  but  alternative  institutional  structures 
suffer because learning effects and large start up costs combine to provide advantage for 
existing structures; path dependent institutional processes result.
12 
 
Several  other  factors,  moreover,  can  conspire  to  reinforce  institutional  stability. 
Proponents  of  path  dependence  have  argued  that  the  presence  of  ‘complementary 
configurations  of  organizations  and  institutions’
13  serves  to  reinforce  stability  as  the 
‘interdependent web of an institutional matrix produces massive increasing returns’.
14 
They present a view of internally coherent political ‘orders’ in which ‘the effects of the 
component parts are cumulative and mutually reinforcing, that they generally point most 
actors in the same (or at least complementary) directions most of the time’.
15 
 
Second, institutionalists claim that processes of ‘lock in,’ by which societal groups adapt 
their  strategies  as  a  function  of  the  prevailing  configuration  of  institutions,  tend  to 
depoliticise  issues.  By  ensuring  the  triumph  of  one  path  over  the  alternatives,  they 
remove conflict over alternative choices.
16  
 
                                                 
10 Pierson, 2000a. Pierson points out the ‘fuzziness’ that has characterised the use of the notion of path 
dependence. He distinguishes between two common uses of the term: a broader sense, which implies 
simply that the early stages of a temporal sequence exert a causal effect on later developments and makes 
no claims regarding the difficulty involved in exiting a particular path, and a narrow conception which 
focuses on the role of increasing returns in making a particular trajectory difficult to change. Exponents of 
the ‘increasing returns’ explanation of institutional stability tend to deploy the latter, more narrow, 
definition. Pierson Ibid.252 
11 Ikenberry, 46 
12 Ibid.71-2 
13 Pierson, 255 
14 North, 95.. Intuitively, there is a potential tension between this tidy view of multiple complementary 
organisations and the far messier view that institutionalists conjures up arguing in favour of institutional 
effects  and  against  functional  approaches  to  institutions.  In  the  latter  narrative,  social  complexity  and 
increasing interdependence between actors, organizations and institutions lead to problems of overload, 
unanticipated consequences, feedback loops and complex interaction effects  Pierson, 2000, 483. 
15 Lieberman, 702. Others, in contrast argue that the issue of multiple regimes does not promote 
institutional change either because there is no clear exit option unavailable in politics Pierson, 259 more on 
this, or because competition between institutions less likely than in economics because political institutions 
‘rarely confront a dense environment of competing institutions that will instantly capitalise on inefficient 
performance, swooping in to carry off an institution’s “customers” and drive it into bankruptcy.’ Pierson, 
261 
16 Pierson, 493   6 
Also central to many accounts of institutional stability is the assumption that institutional 
change involves high costs. Formal institutional change is considered as the most costly 
form of such change because of high contracting costs and uncertainty over outcomes.
17  
Moreover, inherent in many approaches to institutional stability  is the assumption that 
decision rules make institutions still more change resistant. Not least this is so because 
decision makers in politics want to prevent their successors from reversing what they 
have done and so may create institutions even they cannot control.
18 Focus on formal 
decision  rules  spawned  interest  in  veto  players.  Pierson  argues  that  extremely  high 
barriers to reform in EU a deliberate ploy by designers to ensure large obstacles to 
institutional change.
19 (Security same is true for different reasons. Sovereignty concerns 
and desire to maintain control leads to consensus rules).  
 
Finally,  central  to  Pierson’s  argument  about  path  dependence  are  claims  regarding 
aspects of politics that differentiate it from, and make it more prone to increasing returns 
processes  than,  economics.  Crucial  here  is  the  ‘complexity  and  opacity  of  politics;’ 
politics is ‘murkier’ than economics, with actors pursuing a variety of goals characterised 
by ‘loose and diffuse links between actions and outcomes,’ as a result of which it is 
extremely difficult to measure political performance.
20 All of which further reinforces the 
potential for increasing returns processes, inhibiting learning and competition, which are 
key drivers of institutional change in the economic sphere.
21 Others have argued this is 
may  be  particularly  true  of  foreign  policies,  where  success  and  failure  are  inherently 
complex and ambiguous concepts.
22 
 
Many Institutionalist scholars thus emphasise the change resistant nature of institutional 
structures,  often  equating  institutions  with  stability  or  durability.
23  Not  only  is  the 
Institutionalist  lexicon  replete  with  concepts  denoting  the  persistence  of  institutional 
patterns – path dependence, lock in, sequencing, increasing returns amongst others – but 
stability is often assumed in the definitions of key terms.
24 Thus Duffield stipulates that 
                                                 
17 Lindner, 2003, 915 
18 Moe 1995, 124. 
19 Pierson, 262 
20 Ibid.260 
21 Ibid. 
22 Baldwin, 2000,  
23 Clemens and Cook, 442 
24 For a useful survey of attempts by institutionalists to conceive of and explain institutional change, see 
Ibid...   7 
international institutions are best characterised as ‘relatively stable’, defined as implying 
‘persistence,  durability  and  resilience  in  the  face  of  changing  circumstances.’
25 
Consequently,  stable  institutional  politics  ‘appears  as  “normal”,  as  politics  as  usual, 
explicitly or implicitly opposed to extraordinary politics, in which equilibria are upset, 
norms break down, and new institutions are generated’ (Orren and Skowronek, 1994, 
316). 
 
Related to an emphasis on stability is a failure clearly or convincingly to conceptualise the 
nature of ‘change’ itself.
26 Proponents of the notion of path dependence frequently either 
define  institutional  paths  so  broadly  as  to  effectively  define  away  the  prospect  of 
change,
27  or,  by  focussing  only  on  dramatic  shifts,  effectively  define  incremental 
adjustments out of existence.
28  ‘Off path’ change thus becomes exceptionally difficult, 
not least because institutional entrepreneurs face incentives to disguise any change they 
manage to bring about, or at least to cloak it in the familiar.
29  
 
When institutionalists do attempt to account for change, they do so in terms of dramatic 
turning points, often brought about by exogenous shocks, captured in terms such as 
‘critical junctures’ or ‘punctuated equilibria,’ implying sharp breaks from the prevailing 
path.
30 The implication here is that the analytical tools used to analyse ‘normal’ politics of 
institutional stability cannot usefully be deployed to explain change, the drivers of which 
are  generally  conceptualised  as  some  kind  of  deus  ex  machina,
31  explicable  only 
exogenously of the institutions in question, and hence impossible to predict.
32 Junctures, 
moreover,  are  infrequent,  giving  way  almost  immediately  to  further  long  periods  of 
stability: ‘once a moment of institutional selection comes and goes, the cost of large-scale 
institutional change rises dramatically – even if potential institutions, when compared 
with existing ones, are more efficient and desirable’.
33  
 
                                                 
25 Duffield, 2007, 8 
26 For an excellent discussion, see Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005, 1287 
27 Lindner, 916.  
28 Peters, Pierre, and King, 1277 
29 Clemens and Cook, 459 
30 Peters, Pierre, and King, 1289 
31 Clemens and Cook, 447 
32 Peters, Pierre, and King, 1289 
33  Ikenberry,  73,  Krasner,  1984,  .  For  an  excellent  discussion  of  the  notion  of  critical  junctures  and 
suggestions as to how to refine and elucidate the notion further, see Capoccia and Kelemen Capoccia and 
Kelemen, 2007, .    8 
AN INSTITUTIONALIST EXPLANATION OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
 
One paradoxical consequence of the Institutionalist conception of change occurring via 
major shifts from the status quo is to deny institutionalism any analytical purchase in 
explaining such change.
34  Yet an approach to institutions that treats institutional change 
as  exogenous  to  the  theory  itself  is  clearly  unsatisfactory  in  that institutions  ‘explain 
everything until they explain nothing” (Thelen & Steinmo 1992:15).
35 
  
Yet a closer analysis of some of the core claims of the intuitionalist literature reveals a 
tendency to exaggerate the potential for stability. Not least, certain key assumptions of 
dubious validity are revealed as central to any account stressing persistence over change. 
Conflict within, friction between and the adaptability of institutions make change far 
more likely than most Institutionalist accounts imply. If, in addition, a more inclusive 
notion of change is adopted, allowing for both small-scale, incremental change as well as 
the dramatic shifts that are the exclusive focus of much of the Institutionalist literature, a 
different  pattern  emerges  of  profound  instability  and  almost  perpetual  incremental 
change that is difficult to control and potentially hugely significant. The metaphor of 
Chinese whispers perhaps better characterises such institutionalised processes than that 
of path dependence. (need more of an explanation of this) 
 
Contestation 
 
Central  to  many  accounts  of  path  dependence,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  notion  that 
institutional persistence implies consensus around the particular institution.
36 Such claims 
are frequently based on analogical reasoning, with insights from the study of emerging 
technologies applied to the world of political institutions. Yet just as Paul Pierson argues 
that politics differs from economics (in such a way, he claims, as to make increasing 
returns  processes  more  prevalent  in  the  former  than  the  latter)  so,  too,  must  the 
                                                 
34 Peters, Pierre, and King, 1282For game theoretical perspective, see Greif and Laitin Greif and Laitin, 
2004,   
35 independent variables during periods of stability, institutions are transformed 
into dependent variables at moments of change.  
 
36 Peters, Pierre, and King,    9 
differences between politics and the history of technology make us wary of any attempt 
to import lessons from one to the other.  
 
Three core claims can be derived from the literature on emerging technologies. First, 
when a new technology is adopted, rivals tend to disappear. Second, consequently, as 
alternatives  disappear,  consensus  becomes  the  norm  during  settled  periods  of  path 
dependence. Finally, inherent in many such accounts is an assumption that structure 
tends to dominate over agency. Each is of at best debatable applicability to the world of 
politics. 
 
Many  approaches  to  institutions  tend  understate  the  importance  of  conflict  and  the 
workings of power within apparently settled institutional structures,
37 implying instead 
that conflict is a feature merely of critical junctures. Yet those who lose political struggles 
over the nature of an institution do not disappear in the way that betamax videos did. 
Moreover,  as  Kathleen  Thelen  puts  it,  their  ‘adaptation  can  mean  something  very 
different from embracing and reproducing the institution….adapting may mean biding 
their time until conditions shift, or it may mean working within the existing framework in 
pursuit  of  goals  different  from  –  even  subversive  to  –  those  of  the  institution’s 
designers’.
38  
 
Conflict,  therefore,  can  as  much  a  feature  of  path  dependent  periods  as  of  ‘critical 
junctures’.
39    Crucial  here  is  the  role  of  agency  in  accounting  for  both  change  and 
stability. Many Institutionalist accounts are willing to consider a role for agency only at 
moments  of  far-reaching  change.  Thus,  ‘critical  junctures  are  moments  of  relative 
structural  indeterminism  when  wilful  actors  shape  outcomes  in  a  more  voluntaristic 
fashion  than  normal  circumstances  permit…these  choices  demonstrate  the  power  of 
agency by revealing how long-term development patterns can hinge on distant actor 
decisions of the past.’
40  
 
Again, such claims are related to the origins of studies of path dependence in economics. 
Economists emphasise role of chance in shaping the initial direction of path taken by a 
                                                 
37 Capoccia and Kelemen, 353-4, Thelen, 384-87 
38 Thelen, 385-86 
39 Peters, Pierre, and King, 1278 
40 Mahoney 2002, 7.   10 
new technology. Pierson uses an analogy with Polya urn process. In this, a ball is chosen 
at random from two balls of different colours. This is then replaced, along with another 
of same colour. The point here is that random events early in any ‘path’ exert a huge 
influence  and  shape  later  choices.  In  politics,  however,  ‘paths’  tend  to  result  from 
deliberate  choices  on  the  part  of  political  actors.
41.    Both  institutional  stability  and 
institutional  change  involve  such  conscious  decisions,  and  the  wielding  of  political 
power.
42 
 
Assuming the persistence of conflict over institutional outcomes changes the picture in 
important ways. Institutional creators confront two challenges: a collective search for an 
optimal solution to the problem at hand and a need to satisfy the distributive demands of 
all  participants.
43  If  the  stakes  are  high  and  the  evidence  of  potential  benefits  from 
cooperative  action  clear,  there  may  be  not  initial  large  investment  in  dividing  the 
distributive benefits of an institution amongst participants.
44 Rather, their focus will be 
on    their  collective  endeavour,  leaving  plenty  of  scope  for  subsequent  conflict  and 
renegotiation.
45    When  conflict  over  distributional  outcomes  occurs,  this  can  lead  to 
actors dissatisfied by the outcomes produced by the institutional rules challenging their 
application or failing to comply with them. Thus, the seeds of contestation and future 
change may be sown from the moment of institutional creation.
 46  
 
 
Friction 
 
Institutionalists further claim, as we have seen, that the presence of multiple institutions 
will enhance stability because these tend to be mutually reinforcing, ‘synchronized in 
their operations or synthetic in their effects’ (Orren and Skowronek 1994: 321).  There is 
a growing literature dealing with the implications of the proliferation of often competing 
                                                 
41 Capoccia and Kelemen, 353-4 
42 (Kelemen and Capochia, 353-4 on driving on the left and right) 
43 Lindner and Rittberger, 2003,  
44 Conflict over creation leading to vague agreements and consequently easy for 
the rules to be challenged or bent by those dissatisfied with the outcomes? 
45 Ibid. 
46 Thelen also makes point that mechanisms of reproduction sustaining institutions provide clues as to how 
change might come about (397-399), ‘’[k]nowing how institutions were constructed provides insights into 
how they might come apart (p. 400)   11 
or  overlapping  international  organisations,
47  and  the  resultant  ‘regime  complexes’,  or 
arrays of ‘partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular 
issue  area.’
48  Building  on  the  assumption  that  the  creation  of  institutions  does  not 
necessarily put an end conflict about their nature and purpose, the existence of such 
regime complexes provides opportunities for ‘losers.’ 
 
A world of multiple institutions is not necessarily the neat and well-structured place that 
Institutionalist analyses imply. New institutions are not designed on a ‘blank slate,’ in that 
political arrangements do not tend to sweep away ‘the detritus of a previous order to 
construct a new one.’
49  (Thelen makes point on blank slate, pp. 384-5; so do Victor and 
Raustalia,  p.  296).  Nor  do  their  designers  always  manage  clearly  to  demarcate  clear 
boundaries between institutions, thereby increasing the potential conflict between them.
50 
Indeed, because ‘political actors extract causal designations from the world around them 
and these cause-and-effect understandings inform their approaches to new problems,’ 
the presence of multiple institutions increases the chances of ‘institutional isomorphism’, 
whereby new institutions emerge ‘resembling, and similar in logic to’ existing ones.
51  
 
Multiple institutions, created at different times and for often overlapping purposes thus, 
‘juxtapose  different  logics  of  political  order,  each  with  their  own  temporal 
underpinnings,’  (Orren  and  Skowronek,  1994:  320),  and  ‘politics  is  structured  by 
persistent incongruities and frictions among institutional orderings’.
52 The clash between 
organisational  rules  and  cultures  can  lead  to  ongoing  instability,  with  different 
institutions, created at different times and for different purposes, rubbing up against each 
other, causing friction and consequent adaptation. They ‘collide and chafe,’ and it is ‘in 
the friction between orders that we may more readily find the seeds of change within the 
politics of any given moment’.
53  Different coexisting institutional orders are ‘unlikely to 
be connected with each other in any coherent or functional way.’
54 
 
                                                 
47 Alter and Meunier, 2006, , Biermann, 2008, , Busch, 2007, , Raustiala and Victor, 2004,  
48 Raustiala and Victor, 279 
49 Lieberman, 702 
50 Raustiala and Victor, 297 
51 Thelen, 386 
52 Skowronek, 1995, 95 
53 Lieberman, 702 
54 Ibid.   12 
This is important in any understanding of institutional change in that ‘interactions and 
encounters among processes in different institutional realms’ provides the opportunities 
for  such  change.
55  The  existence  of  multiple  institutions  with  overlapping  mandates 
allows actors to ‘seek out the forum most favourable to their interests,’
56 encouraging 
‘venue
57  or  forum
58  shopping  and  providing  multiple  opportunities  for  political 
entrepreneurs.
59  
 
Moreover, opportunities for those dissatisfied with prevailing institutions are heightened 
by the nature of the rules governing individual regimes within such complexes. Political 
leaders, confronted with an increasingly complex institutional landscape characterised by 
varied and complex interests, struggle to specify precise ex ante rules; consequently, they 
resort  to  the  formulation  of  ‘broad,  aspirational  rules’,
60  increasing  the  latitude  for 
subsequent  interpretation,  and  hence  informal  adaptation  of  institutions  by  their 
members. 
 
Adaptation 
 
Conflict within and tensions between institutions create demand and momentum for 
change. These are necessary though not sufficient conditions for such change actually to 
occur, in that those pressing for such institutional change must be able to implement it 
within existing institutional structures.  
 
Proponents of path dependence tend, as we have seen, to emphasise the constraints on 
institutional adaptation presented by the formal rules in place, notably the procedures for 
institutional adaptation and the rules governing such adaptation. George Tsebelis has 
illustrated the importance of ‘veto players,’ and argued that decision-making becomes 
more difficult as the number and heterogeneity of veto players increase.
61  
 
                                                 
55 Thelen, 383 
56 Ibid.280 
57 Baumgartner and Jones, 1991,  
58 Raustiala and Victor,  
59 Alter and Meunier, 365, Clemens and Cook, 459 
60 Raustiala and Victor, 280 
61 Tsebelis 2002.   13 
Formal rules are, however, only part of the story, and for two reasons. First, whilst such 
rules, particularly in combination with a status quo default position, are important, we 
must  also  take  account  of  the  ‘prevailing    orientation  of  the  participants’  and, 
particularly, the ‘decision styles’ that result from these.
62  Fritz Sharpf draws particular 
attention  to  ‘bargaining’  and  ‘problem  solving’  styles.  The  former  implies  that 
participants will pursue individual self-interest and reach agreement only if the expected 
utility of so doing is at least as high as that of non-cooperation. The latter, in contrast, is 
based on the idea of a common utility function and the irrelevance of individual self-
interest. Institutions within which problem-solving approaches predominate will be more 
adaptable than those characterised by bargaining. 
 
The  combination  of  formal  rules  and  bargaining  style  determines  the  potential  for 
institutional adaptability, which varies across institutional settings. Institutions such as 
NATO  within  which  member  states  possess  varying  power  resources  might  see 
hegemonic leadership circumventing change resistant rules. In other cases, as we have 
seen, the bargaining style adopted will be related to the perceived need for change. If the 
perceived benefits of institutional change are high in comparison to the informational 
costs of overcoming interstate bargaining problems,
63 an institutions is morel likely to be 
characterised by a consensual style of bargaining even if the formal rules are constraining.  
(Link to Pierson point about opacity).  
 
Institutional Change 
 
Contestation  and  friction  create  a  ‘climate  for  rule  contestation’,
64  and  institutional 
adaptability  renders  institutional  change  more  possible  than  Institutionalist  analyses 
imply.  
 
As we have seen, much institutionalist thought conceptualises change in terms of critical 
junctures – rare, discreet and often dramatic moments of profound institutional change.  
Yet  such  an  approach  can  merely  serve  to  conceal  or  disguise  other  ways  in  which 
institutional change can occur. Such change does not simply equate to the breakdown of 
one equilibrium and its replacement with another.   
                                                 
62 Scharpf, 1988, 258-62 
63 Moravcsik, 1999, 301 
64 Lindner and Rittberger, 452   14 
 
Useful here is the characterisation provided by Peter Hall, in his investigation of policy 
change. He disaggregates public policy into three elements: the ‘overarching goals that 
guide policy’; the ‘techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals’ and the 
‘precise settings of these instruments’.
65 First, second and third order changes correspond 
to  changes  in  the  settings  of  instruments,  the  choice  of  instruments  and  the  ‘policy 
paradigm’ respectively. First and second order change do not necessarily lead to third 
order change.
66  Yet the their cumulative impact can lead to more profound shifts.  
 
Bruno Palier, in his analysis of changes in French pensions policy presents a graphic 
illustration of the process by which small scale changes in policy instruments can lead to 
far more profound institutional change. First, widespread agreement emerges over the 
failure of existing policies and the instruments deployed in the past.
67  As a consequence, 
new instruments were ‘designed in opposition to past ways of doing things’.
68 Emphasis, 
then, on avoiding previous mistakes rather than on tackling present problems. This way 
of proceeding means there is a temptation to ‘seek solutions at the other extreme from 
the usual, and do the opposite of what has been done up to now…a search for solutions 
to  the  bankruptcies  of  existing  public  policy  strategies  seems  to  be  preferred  to  a 
‘problem solving’ view of public policies based on analysis of the problems themselves.’
69 
One implication of this is that these solutions can be presented in vague terms, with 
ambiguity about their ultimate nature and purpose being key to their acceptance,
70 based, 
as  they  are  on  ‘ambiguous,  even  contradictory,  agreement’.
71  The  seeds  of  future 
contestation, in other words, are sown from the moment that an alternative is settled 
upon.  
 
So much for the scale of change. The other aspect of changes in policy instruments is 
that these can as easily imply ‘off path’ as ‘on-path’ change, the former representing  
‘adaptations of the existing path’ whilst latter can ‘replace the existing mechanism of 
                                                 
65 Hall, 1993, 278 
66 Ibid.279 
67 Palier, 2007, 88. Peters et. al. make a similar point regarding ‘perceived failures of the previous style of 
managing’ in their explanation of administrative reform Peters, Pierre, and King, 1292. All of which 
accords with Peter Hall’s notion of social learning as ‘a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques 
of policy in response to past experience and new information’ Hall, 278  
68 (Palier 2007: 88) 
69 Palier, 95 
70 Ibid.100 
71 Ibid.88   15 
reproduction and introduce a new one.’
72 Small scale, ambiguous first order changes, in 
other words, can cumulatively lead to larger scale off-path institutional changes.  
 
(Need to discuss informal versus formal change as well here. (Also question of what 
latitude existing rules allow for participants to experiment without the need for new 
rules. Informal institutional change, and also potential for the exploitation of ambiguous 
rules.
73) 
 
The  bottom  line  here  is  that  cumulative  incremental  change  can  lead  to  large-scale 
change.
74 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ESDP 
 
The  history  of  the  EU’s  defence  policy  is  a  history  of  almost  continual  institutional 
change, characterised by its gradual emergence over several years, and steady, incremental 
and frequently ambiguous reform thereafter.  
 
Not that this is apparent from many scholarly accounts. In these, the tendency has been 
to portray the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a 
dramatic turning, point - the archetypical ‘critical juncture.’ Observers have dramatized 
the Saint Malo summit of December 1998 at which Britain and France agreed that there 
was a need to give the EU a defence dimension. ‘Historians writing on the birth of a truly 
united  Europe  in  2020,’  we  are  confidently  assured,  ‘will  define  the  Saint  Malo 
declaration as the final stage of European integration.’
75 Jolyon Howorth, in his excellent 
survey of ESDP, was able to remark that it is now something of a  ‘truism’ to date the 
‘birth of the EU as a security actor’ to the ‘seminal event’ at Saint Malo,
76 where, at 
around ‘three o’clock in the morning on Friday 4 December 1998, officials of the French 
and British governments slipped under the bedroom doors of Jacques Chirac and Tony 
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Blair,  both  fast  asleep  in  the  French  seaside  town,  a  document  which  was  to 
revolutionize both the theory and the practice of European security and defence…’
77 
 
Yet reality is somewhat more complex than such accounts would suggest.  In terms of 
formal  treaty  provisions,  the  development  of  an  EU  defence  policy  was  more 
evolutionary than revolutionary. It was the Single European Act that first introduced –
albeit weakly and indirectly - a security role for the EU. This was expanded upon in the 
Maastricht  Treaty,  which  included  amongst  its  objectives  the  ‘eventual  framing  of  a 
common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’ (Article B. Title 
1,  treaty  on  European  Union).  The  same  document  included  practical  stipulations 
allowing the newly-formed European Union to request that the West European Union 
‘elaborate  and  implement  decisions  on  actions  of  the  Union  which  have  defence 
implications’ (Article J.4.2). At a meeting in Bonn in June 1992, the WEU Council of 
Ministers  was  quick  to  capitalize  on  its  new-found  dynamism  and  published  its 
Petersburg  declaration,  outlining  its  willingness  to  undertake  not  only  humanitarian, 
rescue and peace-keeping, but also combat (peace-making) missions.
78 The next iteration 
of  the  Union’s  founding  Treaty,  signed  at  Amsterdam,  saw  the  creation  of  a  High 
Representative  to  serve  as  a  figurehead  for  the  Union’s  international  role,  and  the 
incorporation of these Petersberg tasks, into the treaty itself. Indicative of the piecemeal 
nature of developments in this policy sector are the many and varied claims put forward 
in the academic literature regarding the birth date of the EU’s defence policy. 
79 
 
Following  the  summit,  ESDP  has  continued  to  develop  rapidly  and  in  often 
unpredictable ways. In June 1999, a provisional institutional framework was created; at 
Helsinki  the  following  December,  the  Headline  Goal  for  ESDP  military  forces  was 
established, setting force targets for the EU’s military capabilities.  By June 2001, the 
institutions charged with running ESDP were formalised and made permanent. Eighteen 
months later, EU leaders proclaimed the ESDP operational, in the Laeken Declaration. 
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Subsequently,  the  Union  has  found  itself  engaged  in  ESDP  missions  from  Aceh  in 
Indonesia to the Democratic Republic of Congo, several of which, most notably the 
peace keeping mission deployed to Bosnia (EUFOR) – have involved the deployment of 
significant numbers of troops (6000 in Bosnia). Perhaps most strikingly, and for all the 
early hopes and fears that ESDP would represent some kind of ‘militarisation’ of the 
European Union (not to mention the clear intention on the part of the French and 
British delegations at Saint Malo that ESDP would be a military undertaking), the EU has 
developed over time in quite a different direction. The majority of missions have been 
non-military in nature, with ESDP coming to specialise in what observers have taken to 
calling ‘soft security.’
80     
 
The  crucial  point  here  is  that  the  development  of  ESDP  contradicts  Institutionalist 
accounts that emphasise long periods of institutional stability punctuated by rare but 
dramatic ‘critical junctures.’ Rather, history reveals a continual process of incremental 
change that has seen ESDP develop not only via a series of small scale changes, but also, 
rather  than  along  a  stable  and  settled  institutionally  defined  path,  in  unpredictable 
directions.  
EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
Conflict 
 
The  first  driver  of  this  continuous  process  of  institutional  change  has  been  the 
persistence of conflict between the member states. As argued above, the creation of 
institutions does not end such conflict.  From the early days of the Union’s involvement 
in defence matters, member states were profoundly divided amongst themselves as to the 
nature and purpose of the security policy instrument the EU was engaged in developing. 
Negotiations at Maastricht saw open divisions appearing over these issues,
81 and these 
persisted throughout the decade.  
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Even at the Saint Malo summit, which saw the United Kingdom drop its traditional 
hostility to the notion of an EU competence over defence policy matters, the resultant 
declaration served merely to underline that neither side shared the preferences of the 
other  when  it  came  to  the  role  of  the  new  instrument.  It  juxtaposed,  rather  than 
resolving, potentially contradictory preferences for, respectively, a Union that ‘must have 
the  capacity  for  autonomous  action’,  and  one  that  contributed  ‘to  the  vitality  of  a 
modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its 
members’. At stake was the appropriate relationship of any EU security policy to NATO, 
with London seeing ESDP as a means of reinforcing the transatlantic alliance, whilst at 
least some in Paris viewed it as a means, ultimately, for its replacement.
82 
 
Above  and  beyond  such  tensions,  several  other  member  states  harboured  profound 
reservations about what some perceived as the nascent ‘militarisation’ of the EU.
83 The 
neutral member states in particular expressed serious reservations about tendencies on 
the part of Paris and London to equate ‘security’ with ‘defence’ (Interviews, Brussels, 
1999, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008). 
 
Such tensions led to continual pressures on the prevailing institutional structure. The 
need for member states consensus overall decisions mean that trade offs were inevitable. 
Thus, the Scandinavian states insisted on the development of civilian ESDP as a quid pro 
quo  for  their  acquiescence  in  the  development  of  its  military  dimension.  Continued 
dissensus meant that those agreements reached were, like the Saint Malo declaration,  
often deliberately ambiguous leaving plenty of scope for continued disagreement and 
contrasting interpretations of what ESDP was all about.  
 
Friction 
A second factor accounting for the high levels of incremental institutional change was 
institutional  density  and  continued  friction  between  the  various  European  security 
institutions. Europe is a uniquely institutionalised region. As Strobe Talbott put it:  
 
No  other  part  of  the  world  has  a  web  of  overlapping,  mutually  reinforcing 
political, economic, and security structures comparable to the one anchored in 
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the Euro-Atlantic region. Charts for those regions would be as simple as the one 
for Eurasia is complex.
84  
 
Institutional  density,  as  we  have  seen,  provides  states  with  the  ability  to  select  the 
institutional forum most appropriate to achieve their objectives. During the early 1990s, 
debates over European defence focussed on attempts to create ESDI – a European 
security and defence identity within NATO. The Berlin NATO summit of June 1996 
appeared  to  provide  for  just  this,  with  the  Americans  (reluctantly)  agreeing  that  an 
identifiable European chain of command should be created within the Alliance, allowing 
European  member  states  to  carry  out  missions  even  should  the  US  not  wish  to 
participate.  It  soon  became  clear,  however,  that  Washington,  (and  the  Pentagon  in 
particular),  were  deliberately  impeding  implementation  of  the  plans.    Absent  an 
institutional  alternative,  NATO’s  European  member  states  could  conceivably  have 
chosen to create some kind of informal caucus within NATO. Yet an alternative venue 
did exist. As dissatisfaction with NATO increased as a result of experience in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, the European response was to undertake the creation of ESDP within the EU.
85 
 
Nevertheless, the birth and development of ESDP was profoundly shaped by NATO. 
Not least, ESDP decision-making structures were modelled explicitly on within NATO.
86 
The focus on military decision making and lack of effective coordination between the 
military and civilian aspects of EU security policy reinforced a tendency to think of 
ESDP in military terms, and hence the potential overlap and competition with NATO.  
 
Moreover, the need to reconcile two potentially conflicting institutions led to the 
proliferation of vague agreements specifying the relationship between them. Thus despite 
the existence of formal arrangements in the shape of the Berlin Plus agreements, these 
were so vague as to allow for differing interpretations by different member states. Ankara 
believes that all NATO-EU cooperative endeavours should be governed by the NATO-
EU Framework under Berlin Plus. While the EU refuses to engage in such a framework 
if all its Member States are not involved on an equal footing.
87 
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Adaptation 
 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of European security institutions since the end of the 
Cold War has been the almost perpetual process of adaptation they have undertaken. 
This  despite  formal  decision  rules  stating  the  need  for  consensus  between  all  their 
member states in order that decisions be taken.
88  
 
Central to the adaptability of institutions is, as we have seen, both the nature of the trade 
off  between  transaction  costs  involved  in  agreeing  to  new  rules  and  the  perceived 
demand for such rules and the degree of latitude that exists within exiting rules for 
participants to experiment without the need for new rules.  
 
The demand for new rules allowing for an EU role in security affairs was both clear and 
massive  as  the  Europeans  proved  unable  to  deal  with  the  conflict  in  the  former 
Yugoslavia.  Moreover,  partly  as  a  consequence  of  events  in  the  Balkans,  the  British 
government had come to question the reliability of the United States when it came to 
dealing with security challenges in Europe’s ‘near abroad.’
89 Consequently, reliance on 
existing instruments – a European Union bereft of military capabilities or NATO alone - 
appeared as increasingly infeasible strategies. The search for alternative instruments to 
replace those discredited by past failure led the member states to seize upon ESDP as an 
obvious, highly visible, and reassuringly novel solution (albeit one rooted in necessary 
ambiguity,).  
 
Policy  failure  was,  on  other  words,  in  no  way  opaque  or  ambiguous  in  the  case  of 
European defence., leading to a clear calling into question of previous policies.  Whilst 
bitter  arguments  have  characterised  almost  every  stage  of  the  two  processes,  rapid 
adaptation testifies to the ‘problem solving’ style that has characterised them.  
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Provisional Conclusions 
 
1. Change and Chinese whispers. Continual small scale change leading to large and off 
path change. ‘how large is a change before it ceases to be incremental?’
90  
 
2. findings may not be generalisable to other geographical and functional areas?  
 
3. Security and institutions: Point may be that security institutions, in contradistinction to 
claims in the literature, more likely to be characterised by problem solving decision style. 
This is because of stakes – threat to security and even existence. So nature of ‘high 
politics’ means that institutional creation and change is, paradoxically, easy. One problem 
with much of the literature is seems to draw  - if only implicitly – on model of US. For 
the US it may not make sense to entrust security to institutions and get tied up, but that 
doesn’t apply to smaller powers.  
 
4.  Can’t  separate  neatly  between  institutional  creation  and  change  and  institutional 
effects. Former shape later and vice versa in continual feedback processes. Constant 
potentially  off  path  incremental  change  will  alter  institutional  effects.  Ironically,  may 
maker it hard to detect and account for failure because lack of stability allowing for time 
to assess functioning of an institutional system.  
 
5. This approach therefore strengthens Institutionalist claim about unpredictability of 
outcomes. Even highly predictable incremental change might lead to development of 
instabilities Clemens and Cook 1999: 449 use example of transition of faculty-graduate 
student relationship into one between colleagues. Criticizing institutionalism does not 
imply a return to functionalist argument. Indeed, notion that institutions change over 
time further undermines functionalist claims.
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